Otto Support - SSRF and Token Passthrough with MCP
Summary
Server-side request forgery (SSRF) and token passthrough vulnerabilities are re-emerging risks within Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, despite being well-known web application flaws. These issues, often introduced casually during integrations with enterprise systems like Atlassian and Microsoft, can transform a single mishandled URL into remote code execution (RCE) on a developer's machine or a foothold within a cloud account. Recent disclosures highlight this, including a critical vulnerability chain in mcp-atlassian (CVE-2026-27826, CVSS 8.2), affecting versions prior to 0.17.0, which allowed unauthenticated RCE by exfiltrating sensitive files like AWS credentials. Microsoft's MarkItDown MCP server also exhibited SSRF, enabling IAM role credential retrieval from AWS EC2 instance metadata. Additionally, OpenClaw's marketplace plugin had an SSRF flaw (CVE-2026-41297) via unvalidated redirects. Mitigations include robust destination validation, network segmentation, and largely avoiding token passthrough, or strictly allowlisting destinations if essential.
Key takeaway
For AI Security Engineers or Software Engineers developing MCP integrations, you must prioritize robust input validation and network segmentation. If your MCP server accepts URLs, implement strict destination allowlisting and blocklisting, ensuring checks occur after DNS resolution and redirects. Avoid forwarding client tokens to downstream APIs; instead, use service credentials or token exchange mechanisms like RFC 8693. Failing to enforce these controls risks unauthenticated remote code execution and unauthorized cloud resource access.
Key insights
MCP servers' core functions make them inherently vulnerable to SSRF and token passthrough if inputs are untrusted.
Principles
- Agent tools must operate with minimal necessary privileges.
- Never trust inputs, destinations, or credentials across trust boundaries.
- Tokens require strict audience validation for security.
Method
Prevent SSRF via destination validation, checking resolved IPs against blocklists/allowlists post-DNS and post-redirect. For token passthrough, use service credentials or RFC 8693 token exchange.
In practice
- Validate all URLs accepted by MCP server tools.
- Isolate MCP servers using network segmentation.
- Do not forward client tokens to downstream APIs.
Topics
- Server-Side Request Forgery
- Token Passthrough
- Model Context Protocol
- Vulnerability Management
- Remote Code Execution
- Network Segmentation
Code references
Best for: AI Security Engineer, AI Engineer, Software Engineer
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Editorial summary, takeaway, and curation by AIssential. Original article published by Bishop Fox - Bishopfox.com.